United Nations S/2012/424

Security Council

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Letter dated 8 June 2012 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter dated 31 May 2012, from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, forwarding a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 February to 30 April 2012 (see annex).

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

12-36911 (E) 180612

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Annex

Letter dated 31 May 2012 from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2011 (2011), I attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from 1 February to 30 April 2012 (see enclosure). I would appreciate it if you could make this report available to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Anders Fogh **Rasmussen**

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the Security Council on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

Introduction

1. The present report, pursuant to the request in Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2011 (2011), informs the United Nations on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 1 February to 30 April 2012. As at 18 April 2012, total ISAF strength stood at 128,961 personnel provided by all 28 NATO countries and 22 non-NATO countries. NATO and ISAF reiterate their invitation to additional United Nations Member States to support this United Nations-mandated mission by providing advisers and trainers to the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as increase their funding support to the Afghan security forces and support for the civilian sectors of governance and development.

2. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. From 1 February to 30 April 2012, ISAF suffered 731 casualties, including 53 killed in action, 642 wounded in action and 36 non-battle-related deaths.

3. During the reporting period, the number of reported security incidents remained in line with seasonal trends, albeit at lower levels compared to the same period of the previous year. The decreased levels are likely due to the winter weather (with a normal to slightly above normal snowpack), the continuously improving capabilities of the Afghan security forces and the high operational tempo maintained by the Afghan and ISAF forces. The insurgency was unable to reclaim lost ground but, despite losses, remain resilient and pragmatic. In those geographic areas transitioned to Government control, the Afghan security forces proved capable of maintaining, or even further improving the security situation. The progress of the Afghan forces was definitely prominent during the insurgent attacks in Kabul on 15 April. Although the insurgent attacks garnered significant media attention worldwide, they were ineffective from a military perspective. As stated publicly by the Commander of ISAF, the Afghan security forces responded quickly and professionally to the attacks, and their countermeasures were well led and well coordinated with very limited assistance from ISAF.

4. Additional noteworthy events during the reporting period:

(a) On 20 February, the mishandling of Islamic religious material and Korans at the United States detention facility in Parwan Province resulted in widespread and violent demonstrations across the country. While not responsible for the burning, ISAF immediately expressed its regret to the Afghan people and reiterated that nothing in the ISAF mission was intended to defame Islam or desecrate the Koran. The overall performance of the Afghan security forces in handling the public reaction was commendable;

(b) On 7 April, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board discussed the issue of the future size and structure of the Afghan security forces and agreed that a preliminary analysis showed that funding of $4.1 billion annually, including from the Government of Afghanistan resources and contributions from the international community, would be enough to sustain an Afghan security force capable of

providing sufficient security against foreseeable threats. The preliminary model for a future Afghan force, as defined by the international community and the Government of Afghanistan, envisages a force strength of 228,500. This number and other planning assumptions will be subject to revision, in accordance with conditions on the ground and through mutual agreement between Afghanistan and the international community;

(c) Following the signature by the United States of America and the Government of Afghanistan of a memorandum of understanding transferring the lead to Afghan forces in all special operations missions in Afghanistan involving United States forces, the decision that ISAF special operations follow the same principles was taken. In future, special operations will be approved by the Afghan Operational Coordination Group and will be conducted by Afghan forces in accordance with Afghan laws;

(d) On 14 April, Salhuddin Rabbani (son of the previous, assassinated Chair of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani) was formally appointed as the new Chair of the Council by President Karzai.

Security situation

5. Enemy-initiated attacks have again declined, with an 11 per cent decrease over 2011. Insurgent efforts to maintain operations through the winter with high-profile attacks and assassinations were largely ineffective, owing to a combination of Afghan security force and ISAF operations. In addition, the winter weather, which after a number of mild winters returned to normal, had an impact on the insurgent activity. The insurgents are now preparing for the forthcoming fighting season and protecting their expected revenue sources associated with the ongoing poppy harvest.



6. The insurgency continued to give priority to the use of improvised explosive devices, avoiding direct engagement. The assassination attempts against Government officials will continue in order to disrupt the Government's ability to carry out effective governance and to discredit its ability to provide security among the Afghan population. During the reporting period, 67 per cent of civilian

casualties were caused by the insurgents' indiscriminate setting off of improvised explosive devices. Approximately 70 per cent of improvised explosive devices and mines planted by the insurgents were found and cleared.

7. Regionally, the security situation is as follows:

(a) **Regional Command Southwest**. Enemy-initiated attacks for the reporting period decreased by 9 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The Afghan security forces and ISAF continue their efforts to extend the security bubble into the northern and southern districts of Helmand Province. The insurgents are concentrating on defending their safe havens in Helmand Province, pre-positioning fighters for the upcoming fighting season and protecting expected revenue sources associated with the poppy harvest. The insurgents' focus is on countering the Governor-led eradication efforts. Afghan security force and ISAF efforts have resulted in insurgency losses and financial and logistic shortages that will force the insurgency to employ economy-of-force tactics to conserve their combat power. They do retain the capability to conduct complex attacks and intimidation to undermine the Government's security and governance efforts;



(b) **Regional Command South**. Enemy-initiated attacks for the reporting period decreased by 8 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. Insurgents in Regional Command South sought to regain influence, recapture lost safe havens and re-establish freedom of movement, despite the fact that their efforts were discouraged by the improving capability of the Afghan security forces and the success of the Afghan force and ISAF operations. The security incidents were similar to those that occurred during the same period in 2011, such as the explosion of improvised explosive devices targeting the Afghan security forces and ISAF and increasing assassinations of Afghan forces and Government officials to undermine security gains and limit the Government's ability to govern. Kandahar Province, in particular Kandahar City, remains the main focus of the Taliban's efforts to regain influence over the population;



(c) **Regional Command East**. During the reporting period, the most populated area in Afghanistan witnessed an 18 per cent decrease in enemy-initiated attacks over the same period in 2011. Regional Command East continues to experience a slightly decreased level of insurgent activity, following the nationwide trend. Decreased numbers of insurgent attacks may be a direct response to focused Afghan security force and ISAF operations in the border regions. Despite this progress, insurgents have been able to maintain freedom of movement and the ability to conduct effective attacks in the region. Insurgent activity has been characterized by cooperation from several separate insurgent groups, each with their own agenda. The Afghan force and ISAF operations are focused on supply routes in order to disrupt the flow of fighters and material originating in Pakistan and therefore hamper insurgent operations. Cooperation between the Afghan forces, ISAF and the Palestinian military has improved this quarter and will remain critical in the fight against the insurgency, as the sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to provide the insurgency with safe areas from which they can plan, coordinate and facilitate their operations in Afghanistan;



(d) **Regional Command North**. Regional Command North has seen a decrease in enemy-initiated attacks for eleven consecutive months. During the reporting period, such attacks decreased by 29 per cent compared to the same period last year. There has been a continuing trend of decreasing insurgent activity in this last quarter in Regional Command North. Owing to a lack of capabilities and severe winter conditions, insurgents avoided direct engagement with ISAF forces and concentrated on improvised explosive device strikes against and assassinations of Afghan security forces and Government officials. Following the mishandling of religious materials at Bagram Airfield in February 2012, Regional Command North witnessed the second largest number of demonstrations, most of the demonstrations having occurred in Regional Command East. The insurgency remains present and active in localized areas, such as Faryab, Baghlan and Badakhshan Provinces, and focused on protecting safe havens;



(e) **Regional Command West**. During the reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks increased by 39 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. Against a very low baseline, Regional Command West continues to display a consistently low level of enemy-initiated attacks. Insurgents are trying to maintain their current safe havens as they suffered a significant loss of influence and control over many areas during the past fighting season. Insurgent actions will continue to increase as the weather improves and prior to the start of the poppy harvest;



(f) **Regional Command Capital**. Regional Command Capital, which has fully entered the transition process, has the lowest number of attacks for any of the Regional Commands. During the reporting period, there was a slight decrease in enemy-initiated attacks, owing to improved Afghan security force capacity and harsh winter weather conditions. The attacks in Kabul on 15 April were the most significant events during this period. Despite the successes of the Afghan forces, Kabul will remain a primary target of insurgent operations because of the significant media and political attention that incidents in the capital can generate.



Afghan National Security Forces

8. Over the past three months, the Afghan security forces have maintained steady increases in overall force size and are on track to meet the approved 352,000 end strength goal by October 2012. This strength target is intended to provide security for all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and is designed to enable the consolidation of ISAF gains and the successful transition to Afghan-led security. To this end, the Afghan forces demonstrated an increasing ability to synchronize security operations across Afghanistan and to ensure the security in areas already transitioned with less ISAF direct support. As stated in the previous reports, the professionalization of the Afghan security forces is ongoing at a high tempo to successfully foster the Afghan lead for security and the effectiveness of the forces.

9. The institutional capability of the Afghan security forces is steadily improving. There are improvements in leader development, instructor training, literacy levels, equipping and institutional transition (activities transitioned or to be transitioned) from the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan to the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence. One notable accomplishment during this period was the development and implementation of Operation Naweed 1391, the first campaign plan for the forces developed by Afghans. In addition, efforts are being made to reduce attrition in the force and to address the important shortage of non-commissioned officers.

10. The continued development of the national security coordination system, especially through the operations coordination centres, is important to ensure coordination among all national, regional, and provincial security forces. Although the Afghan security forces are slowly developing an ability to react to unforeseen

events, their response to the insurgent attacks in Kabul on 15 April demonstrated their growing capability. Similarly, the forces' ability to plan and project security for significant static events is improving quickly.

11. Continued training and focus on the Afghan security forces' special skills, literacy, cross-coordination and command and control will be important over the next six months in both preventing the insurgency from regaining lost ground and ensuring the successful transition of security responsibility to the forces in key terrain areas. At this stage, ISAF partnering and advising efforts remain necessary to reinforce the overall cohesion of the security system and to foster the Afghan personnel's willingness at every level.

12. The health-care system of the Afghan security forces is being developed with a focus on the development of the Warrior Care Programme, highlighting six key areas: organization, personnel, logistics, medical evacuation, education and training, and quality management.

Afghan National Army

13. The Afghan National Army's current strength of 194,466 soldiers (as at March 2012) indicates that the national army will likely achieve its October 2012 growth target of 195,000 as early as May 2012.

14. The quality of national army headquarters and units is growing slowly but steadily and provides the Afghans with an improved ability to plan and execute operations independently and to effectively tackle the attacks of the insurgents with minimal support from ISAF. Furthermore, as the army continues to increase the quality and quantity of its own instructors, its training system is progressively gaining independence. The Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan continues to promote female integration and provide literacy training, with support from ISAF, to both new recruits and those currently serving.

15. The NATO Training Mission, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, continues its efforts to professionalize the force, diminish leader shortfalls, decrease attrition rates and improve staff planning, tactical coordination and the army's logistical capabilities.

Afghan Air Force

16. The development and professionalization of the Afghan Air Force are under way. Over the past six months the Air Force has made marginal gains in its force strength, reaching 5,500 personnel late in March 2012. The authorized force strength of the Force is 8,000 by 2016. Because of the technical skills required throughout the Air Force and human capital constraints, the Force's growth will continue slowly. To this end, important investments are required to improve the Air Force's training sites and infrastructure. Consequently, the Air Force will remain dependent on donor nations and other support until it achieves full operational capability by December 2016.

Afghan National Police

17. The Afghan National Police has maintained a steady increase in the size of its force, and with the current strength of 149,642 (as at 7 April 2012), it will be capable of achieving its October 2012 growth target of 157,000. The national police

continues to focus its efforts on recruiting direct entry non-commissioned officers and training and promoting patrolmen in order to increase its non-commissioned officer ranks.

18. The operational effectiveness of the national police has been improving at a pace acceptable to sustain transition. The fraction of operations that were partnered remained high, with an increasing percentage being led by the Afghan security forces. Trends in the assessment ratings of the national police continued to be positive, showing increased numbers of units rated "effective with advisers" or better. Afghan perceptions of the national police appear to have generally improved as well, showing an increased awareness of the presence of the security forces and generally positive trends in the professionalism and independence of the national police. On 3 May, the Minister of the Interior hosted a conference on the future of the national police. The conference centred on the professionalization of the national police, the reform of the Ministry of the Interior and the strengthening of linkages to the justice sector. Delegates from the national police and the Ministry noted that, as the security situation improved, the focus of the police should shift from counter-insurgency to more traditional law enforcement. They also noted the national police's pivotal role in countering corruption, promoting human rights and increasing female participation in Afghan society. Working groups will develop proposals to progress the conference agenda.

19. Although there is a growing recognition of female roles in the Afghan security forces, only 1,313 women serve in the national police, significantly below the target outlined by the Ministry of the Interior (1,753 women in its ranks by March 2012).

Afghan Public Protection Force

20. The Afghan Public Protection Force is in the process of assuming security missions from private security companies, which were outlawed by Afghan Presidential Decree 62 in August 2010.[a] To ensure a successful transfer of private security companies to the APPF, ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan also agreed on an interim solution for risk management companies to assume some former private security company missions.

21. In mid-March, private security companies were granted an extension of 30 to 90 days to transfer their activities to the Public Protection Force. This stopgap measure allowed security providers to operate under the Public Protection Force even as they pursued permanent risk management company licences. This bridging mechanism enabled the Ministry of the Interior to meet President Karzai's deadline for transitioning private security companies into the Public Protection Force by 20 March while at the same time ensuring that security for convoy operations and development sites continues uninterrupted. The Public Protection Force is expected to be ready to assume responsibility for convoy and development site security by the first week of August 2012. ISAF is working closely with the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that as the Public Protection Force matures, it continues to support commercial and development efforts. Assistance from the Public Protection Force's

[a] According to the Presidential Decree, all security services for development projects and ISAF convoys must be transitioned to the Public Protection Force by March 2012, and security services for ISAF bases and construction sites must be transitioned no later than March 2013.

partner ministries[b] is still critical to accomplish the successful transfer of private security companies to the Public Protection Force and the overall requirements needed for the Force's goals to be met by March 2013.

Civilian casualties

22. The issue of civilian casualties is of great concern to ISAF, and the need to effectively manage the consequences of such incidents is considered critically important.

23. During the reporting period, the total number of civilian casualties decreased by 44 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The insurgents were accountable for approximately 90 per cent of all incidents relating to civilian casualties. The number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties decreased by 62 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. It is noticeable that the number of civilian deaths caused by ISAF Air Operations and road traffic accidents decreased significantly compared to the same period in 2011. However, insurgents can still exploit and manipulate civilian casualty-related events to their advantage. The figures set out below reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. ISAF policy directs all credible allegations of civilian casualties to be reviewed.



Counter-narcotics

24. ISAF continues, in accordance with its mandate, to provide support to the Government's counter-narcotics programmes and operations in order to disrupt, neutralize and influence the narcotics industry and its funding of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

[b] Includes the timely issuance of visas by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, work permits by the Ministry of Labour, communication licences by the Ministry of Communication and armoured vehicle licences by the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that there is no gap in security.

25. Early reporting of this year's poppy harvest shows opium cultivation to be in keeping with original forecasts and consistent with 2011 levels. While initial indications showed that the rate of cultivation was falling in areas with better security, reporting continues to indicate the movement of farmers away from traditional growing areas towards more remote areas in Afghanistan for cultivation.

26. Movement of cultivation areas could potentially signal a shift in processing areas, as processing and trafficking activity will also shift to permissive environments created by a lack of security forces. Opium cultivation and processing remain correlated with a lack of security. While the extent of farmer and processing movement is currently unknown, this movement is a result of successful counter-narcotics efforts on the part of the Government and Afghan security forces and a significant ISAF presence, which impede the freedom of movement of narcotics in historical growing areas.

27. Insurgents continue to benefit from the narcotics trade and have begun the collection of their annual poppy harvest tax. This harvest tax remains the insurgents' largest operational income generator and is vital to the conduct of the insurgents' fighting season. As a result of pressure from ongoing Afghan security force and ISAF operations, revenues resulting from post-harvest output remain vulnerable to disruption. Operations between 1 January and 31 March 2012 have seized over 20,000 kg of opium and 18,000 kg of hashish. While drug and precursor chemical seizure levels are lower compared to the corresponding period in 2011, operations in 2012 still have the potential to provide a sustained period of pressure against narcotics traffickers and the insurgents.

28. While the disruption to all aspects of the narcotics trade remains significant, there will be no long-term impact unless Afghan counter-narcotics operations are sustained[c] and convictions upheld, as the trade remains dependent on both Afghan will and capacity to conduct operations. Therefore, programmes to prepare the Afghan security forces and improve capabilities at all levels remain vital to ensure that Afghanistan is able to sustain counter-narcotics operations in the longer term. Unless security is maintained, and corruption addressed, the narcotics trade will continue to thrive in Afghanistan.

Governance

29. ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, in particular in the key areas of transition, reintegration, counter-corruption and rule of law improvement. The Afghan security forces and ISAF jointly implemented Operation Naweed ("good news") 1391 this quarter, with the Afghan forces in the lead and ISAF providing support. The operation synchronizes ISAF and Government governance objectives and focuses efforts on addressing corruption by implementing the rule of law, building budget capacity and connecting the national and subnational levels of Government. This quarter, ISAF also continued to strengthen relationships with Government ministries, donors and international community stakeholders to keep apprised of their governance and development efforts and, where appropriate to the ISAF campaign plan, inform their decision-making on what ISAF views as its key priorities.

[c] The Afghan national drug strategy is based on eight pillars: public awareness, international and regional cooperation, alternative livelihoods, demand reduction, law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication and institution-building.

30. The transition process, which saw successful Afghan-led tranche 2 transition ceremonies, is still well under way. With the incoming implementation of tranche 3, the Afghan security forces will be in the lead for the security of approximately 75 per cent of the Afghan population.

31. Despite a significant number of insurgents (approximately 1,000) joining the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme over the period, reintegration has yet to have a decisive effect in Afghanistan. The number of reintegrated persons is currently just over 4,100 (as at the end of April 2012). The programme has not yet attracted large numbers of Pashtuns in the heartland of the insurgency, in particular in the south. Nevertheless, encouraging signs were observed in Regional Commands East and South, where the number of reintegrated persons doubled. In Regional Command Southwest, the increase was over 30 per cent, and in Regional Command West the reintegration events occurred mainly in Herat and Farah instead of Badghis, which has had the highest numbers of reintegrated persons to date. The programme is starting to take hold in Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand and in a small number of provinces in Regional Command East. Supported by ISAF, the programme's structures and capacity continue to develop while still encountering some difficulties at the Provincial Joint Secretariat Team level.

32. The NATO-led building integrity initiative is now ongoing to develop action plans for both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior that focus on developing capacity in the areas of finance and human resources management. Senior leaders from NATO have made frequent visits to Kabul to advance these initiatives with key leaders from the two Ministries, and the publication of the final documents is expected in the near future. Other building integrity initiatives that continue to be developed include an option to create a building integrity centre in Kabul.

33. The NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission continues to work with the Government of Afghanistan to improve the provision of State justice with qualified personnel at the provincial and district levels. About 12 per cent of the districts continue to lack courts, especially in Regional Commands East, South and Southwest, and there is a shortage of specialist courts outside the major cities.

Development

34. In coordination with the NATO senior civilian representative, Provincial Reconstruction Team countries affected by tranches 1 and 2 delivered their evolution plans, which were endorsed and monitored by the Joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* Board. In accordance with those evolution plans, the Swedish-Finnish Provincial Reconstruction Team in Balkh closed its provincial offices in Samangan and Sari Pul in 2011 and officially renamed the Balkh Provincial Reconstruction Team as a Transition Support Team in March 2012. The German Provincial Advisory Team in Takhar also completed its operations and was phased out during the reporting period. Sweden and Germany have expressed their intent to continue their support to those provinces on a transient basis. Preparation for tranche 3 of the transition process is in the final phase, and evolution planning by Provincial Reconstruction Team countries that are expected to be affected by tranche 3 is well under way.

35. In parallel with the transition process, the improved capability of the Afghan security forces has proven helpful in providing stability and security in infrastructure project areas. In addition, the use of Afghan local police along Route

611 in Helmand Province has been a significant factor in improving the security situation throughout the Sangin Valley, which has made access possible and improved security at the Kajaki Dam, the main electricity producer for the southern provinces. Furthermore, in Regional Command East, the construction of the Naghlu-Jalalabad 110-kV transmission line has continued uninterrupted since the deployment of Afghan security forces and community-based security personnel in October 2011.

Children affected by armed conflict

36. ISAF (NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have committed to collaborating in order to support the Government of Afghanistan with the implementation of the United Nations and Government action plan, signed on 11 January, to stop and prevent grave children's rights violations, including actions to prevent underage recruitment in the Afghan security forces, sexual abuse, sexual violence and the killing and maiming of children.

37. ISAF and UNAMA have jointly taken several concrete, practical steps, in particular in supporting Afghan institutions in implementing the action plan:

(a) The Commander of ISAF has directed ISAF units to report incidents of underage recruitment into the Afghan security forces or other incidents of violations against children;

(b) In a broader perspective, the Commander's Tactical Directive is supporting this issue, with special emphasis on the protection of the Afghan population against the consequences of the conflict;

(c) ISAF is financially supporting the Ministry of the Interior of Afghanistan in developing and implementing a nationwide awareness-raising campaign for the prevention of underage recruitment. Included in the campaign are the publication of pocket guides for all Afghan security force personnel, the launch of billboard campaigns and the use of radio and television messages.

38. ISAF stays committed to its support of monitoring and reporting violations against underage recruitment or any other violation against children by armed actors.

Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and gender perspective

39. ISAF stays committed to implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and related resolutions. It has incorporated gender perspective in operational planning documents throughout the chain of command. The Commander's operational plan has a gender annex outlining how a gender perspective, including men, women, girls and boys, must be implemented as part of the overall campaign, and that, given the historical, social and cultural position of Afghan women, women's perspectives must be specifically addressed in all ISAF operations. In addition, several fragmentary orders have been released to support a number of initiatives, including an initiative that focuses on increasing the number of women in the Afghan security forces and enhancing its female engagement capability.

40. ISAF appointed personnel throughout the structure, such as gender advisers, gender field advisers, gender focal points, and staff members and tactical teams

working with female engagement, to ensure that gender perspectives are addressed and handled.

41. ISAF has strengthened and increased dialogue with Afghan women through, for example, female security *shuras*.

42. ISAF supports the Government's gender integration and awareness efforts throughout the Afghan security forces and is committed to continuing to monitor, report and support progress in this area.

United Nations S/2012/425

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 June 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 11 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

It is with great regret that I would like to convey to you that the Chief Negotiator of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, Pagan Amum, has violated paragraph 1 (vi) of Council resolution 2046 (2012), which calls for immediate cessation of hostile propaganda, when, during a press conference after the last round of negotiations held in Addis Ababa from 29 May to 8 June, he addressed inflammatory rhetoric against Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan; the Minister of Defense, Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein; and the Director-General of National Security and Intelligence, Mohamed Atta Elmula Abass.

Furthermore, this attitude violates all the principles of negotiations which reaffirm the necessity of good faith as a principal prerequisite for successful negotiations.

I would appreciate it if the present letter would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

12-36946 (E) 120612

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United Nations A/66/828–S/2012/426

General Assembly
Security Council

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12 June 2012

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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 35
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 11 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia dated 8 June 2012, on the twentieth round of the Geneva International Discussions (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-37206 (E) 150612

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Annex to the identical letters dated 11 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the twentieth round of the Geneva International Discussions

The twentieth round of the Geneva International Discussions was held on 8 June 2012. The participants of the Discussions took part in an individual capacity in two working groups, one focusing on security and stability in Georgia's occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, and the other on the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the places of their original residence. The discussions were co-chaired by representatives of the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and attended by participants from Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States. The Head of the Provisional Administration of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District, the Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and representatives of the proxy regimes from Tskhinvali and Sokhumi also took part in the Discussions.

On 7 June an information session on the legal aspects of occupation was held. The invited legal experts, Louise Doswald-Beck and Hans Peter Gasser, reviewed the principal sources and relevant concepts of international law pertaining to occupation. By highlighting the crucial importance of illegal military presence and effective control for determining the fact of occupation, the presentation left little doubt about the nature of Russia's presence in Georgia's two regions. During the discussions in the first working group, the Georgian side yet again demonstrated to the participants that the Russian Federation continues to occupy two regions of Georgia. Another important lesson that can be drawn from the information session is that human rights need to be protected by those who exercise effective control, no matter what the status of the regions in question. We hope that this important conclusion will be to the benefit of the residents of the occupied regions.

In the framework of the first working group, the Georgian delegation once again called upon Russia to fulfil its outstanding obligation and to reciprocate Georgia's pledge not to use force. Georgia expressed hope that through the good offices of the co-chairs, tangible progress in that direction will be made soon. It is noteworthy that the co-chairs and the United States maintain a similar position on the necessity for the Russian Federation to pledge the non-use of force. Work will continue on that issue during the next rounds, and we hope that the positive momentum created by the discussions during the recent rounds will be maintained.

The Georgian side once again expressed its concern with Russia's plans to hold a military exercise entitled "Caucasus 2012" in the fall of 2012. Especially concerning are the contradictory statements of the Russian officials regarding the objectives, nature, location and scale of the drills. The participants from Georgia called upon the relevant military and security officials of the Russian Federation to confirm the earlier diplomatic reassurances that the exercises would not involve the military bases outside Russian territory, namely, the bases in the occupied Georgian regions.

The Georgian side drew the attention of the participants of the Discussions, particularly the co-chairs, to the recent attempts by the Russian Federation to orchestrate terrorist acts from the occupied territories, which pose a terminal threat to security and stability of Georgia and the wider region. Deriving from the evidence submitted earlier and the responses provided by Moscow, Georgian participants asked for further clarifications from the Russian side. The Georgian side believes that it is absolutely necessary to internationalize the investigation process of these terrorist acts and to use all instruments available to the sides through the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms, as well as other means.

The Georgian delegation once again called upon the Russian Federation to meet its obligations under the 12 August Ceasefire Agreement and to withdraw the troops from the occupied Georgian regions. Similar calls were also made by other participants. Georgia believes that the co-chairs need to reactivate their efforts towards elaborating an acceptable concept of international security arrangements: a comprehensive and sustainable way for ensuring peace, security and stability on the ground. The Georgian side remains strongly of the opinion that international peacekeeping and a police presence are necessary components of any international security arrangement.

During the Discussions, a significant amount of time was dedicated to finding a solution to the problem that emerged with regard to the functioning of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism after the declaration by the Sokhumi regime not to allow the Head of the European Union Monitoring Mechanism, General Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, to Gali. Unfortunately, no solution was found to the issue, despite the attempts of the co-chairs and the Georgian side to find a way out. The Georgian side would like to reiterate that if the attempts of the co-chairs to find an acceptable solution fail, without prejudice to the role of the European Union Monitoring Mechanism and its head in the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms, all responsibility for the ceasing of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms will fall on Moscow and its proxy regime in Sokhumi.

No progress was reported by the second working group, despite attempts from the Georgian side to engage the participants in a constructive discussion over the document on the principles of safe and dignified return of displaced persons. Participants from Russia and its proxy regimes continued to reject the internationally recognized right to safe and dignified return of the internally displaced persons and refugees and to discuss the concrete proposals related to returns, despite being evident that such a stance fundamentally contradicts international law. In the framework of the second working group, the Georgian delegation shared with the co-chairs the factual data on the violation of the human rights of the residents of the occupied territories, including the right to education in native language; freedom from persecution and arbitrary detention; and freedom of movement. Calls were made to allow the international monitoring of the human rights situation on the ground.

The co-chairs endorsed the Georgian initiative aimed at building confidence and encouraging people-to-people dialogue through humanitarian visits to the sites of particular interest, for example, cemeteries, cultural and religious sites, on both sides of the occupation line. The Georgian side awaits further progress on the issue and hopes that such sites will be maintained and protected while the discussions on the visits continue in Geneva.

During the Discussions, participants of both working groups discussed status-neutral travel documents. Participants from Georgia shared with the interested participants the benefits of such documents. The Georgian side once again made it clear that status-neutral travel documents only serve the purpose of de-isolating the occupied regions and opening up for the residents of the occupied regions benefits associated with freer travel, education abroad and international tourism. In the sa context, the necessity to ensure free movement of the residents of the occupied regions across the Administrative Boundary Line was stressed by many participants. During the upcoming discussions, the Georgian side expects the co-chairs to table concrete recommendations on the principles of free movement, aimed at ensuring the predictability of the crossing regime across the Administrative Boundary Line.

The twenty-first round of the Geneva International Discussions will be held in October 2012.

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Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 8 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 29 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia addressed to the Secretary-General (A/66/818-S/2012/377).

It has been internationally recognized, including by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, that the Daghlyq Garabagh (Nagorno Karabakh) region and seven surrounding districts of the Republic of Azerbaijan have been occupied by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia. The aforementioned letter, including its attachment, is further factual evidence of Armenia's direct responsibility for the military aggression against Azerbaijan and its continuing effective control over Azerbaijan's occupied territories.

The puppet separatist entity established in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, which the Permanent Representative of Armenia attempts to propagate through his letters, is nothing but the product of aggression and racial discrimination against Azerbaijan and its population. This ethnically constructed subordinate separatist entity is totally under the Republic of Armenia's direction and control and survives only by virtue of the latter's political, military, economic and other support. The illegality of this entity and its structures has been repeatedly stated at the international level in the most unambiguous manner.

In my previous letter, dated 16 May 2012 (A/66/808-S/2012/330), on a military parade held by the leadership of the Republic of Armenia in the city of Khankendi (occupied Daghlyq Garabagh region of Azerbaijan), on the basis of analysis of the types of weaponry demonstrated at the parade, I presented irrefutable facts attesting

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to Armenia's political and military control over, and its continuing military build-up in, the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In addition to these facts, I would like to draw your attention to the following information:

- Special forces marching at the parade were armed with a new model of "Kalashnikov" submachine guns, which are identical to the gun type modernized by Ukraine. According to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, 16,500 pieces of these submachine guns were imported by Armenia from Ukraine in 2010
- 12.77 mm M-93 "Black Arrow" sniper rifles were displayed at the parade. According to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) small arms and light weapons information exchange, Armenia imported 250 pieces of M-93 "Black Arrow" sniper rifles from Serbia between 2007 and 2008
- Four pieces of 273 mm WM-80 "Typhoon" multiple rocket launcher systems purchased, according to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, by Armenia from the People's Republic of China in 1999, were demonstrated at this parade and during the one held in Yerevan on 21 September 2011. These rocket systems are listed on the information exchange within the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the OSCE Vienna Document, and belong to the Independent Artillery Brigade dislocated in Balahovit, Armenia
- Mi-8MT and Mi-24 type attack helicopters demonstrated at the parade in Khankendi have been listed in the annual information exchange of Armenia in the framework of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the OSCE Vienna Document, and belong to the 15th Aviation Base dislocated in Yerevan
- 9K72 "Elbrus" operational-tactical missile systems ("Scud-B" in North Atlantic Treaty Organization classification), which for the first time had been displayed at the parade held in Yerevan on 21 September 2011, were also paraded in Khankendi as a weapon system belonging to the armed forces of Armenia
- The almost identical scenarios and modalities of military parades held in Yerevan and Khankendi demonstrate that both parades had been planned, equipped, trained, organized and orchestrated from the same military chain of command in Armenia

The foregoing points to the fact that Armenia can easily move accounted for and registered military equipment from its territory to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan without any disclosure that has to be made within the United Nations transparency measures in armaments, as well as in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The weaponry displayed at the military parade in Khankendi indicates that Armenia is in breach of its obligations as an end-user under arms import operations, including, in particular, by exporting or transferring procured armaments without the agreement of the exporting States, and not reporting these operations within the existing information exchange mechanism of OSCE.

The facts presented in my previous letter, dated 16 May 2012, and above once again confirm Armenia's direct military aggression and policy of occupation against

Azerbaijan. They also constitute a blatant violation by Armenia of its obligations under international law, as well as its respective commitments under the existing arms control regimes to which Armenia is a party.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and the aforementioned information circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 39, 67 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 8 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to inform you about the recent deadly, brutal ceasefire violations and subversive actions by Azerbaijan along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, as well as the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh.

On 4 June, an Azerbaijani military unit intruded into Armenian territory and tried to ambush the members of the Armenian armed forces stationed near the settlements of Berdavan and Chinari of the Tavush region of the Republic of Armenia. As a result of these illegal actions, three Armenian servicemen were killed and several soldiers were wounded. A similar attempt was made by the Azeri forces on 5 June on the territory of the Tavush region, which resulted in additional casualties. On 6 June, an Azerbaijani armed unit tried to pass the contact line between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan, as a result of which one Karabakhi soldier lost his life and two were wounded.

All conflict situations are unique; however, they share a common point: a resolution to a conflict can be achieved and succeed only once the parties dismiss violence as a means of achieving their goals. The same was highlighted during the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairmanship conference on the Northern Ireland peace process on 27 April. The very same day, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group released a statement in Dublin expressing their deep concern over a series of ceasefire violations along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the line of contact. The Co-Chairs stated that they "strongly condemn any loss of life, and reiterate that there is no alternative to a peacefully negotiated settlement of the conflict". This statement was made following another violation two days earlier, on 25 April, when Azerbaijani forces killed three Armenian soldiers.

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It is worth mentioning that, during the discussions of the OSCE Permanent Council on the unified budget for 2012 in December 2011, Azerbaijan rejected the proposed increase to the budget of the Personal Representative of the Chairperson in Office, which would have made operational the agreement between Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the March 2011 Sochi summit to create a mechanism for investigating ceasefire violations along the line of contact. In its statement, the Armenian side emphasized that, by rejecting implementation of the investigative mechanism, Azerbaijan bore all of the responsibility for further ceasefire violations and victims caused by them.

Sadly, the Azerbaijani side continues to reject the implementation of confidence-building measures, notably proposals of the OSCE Chairmanships and the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group on consolidation of ceasefire, withdrawal of snipers and creation of the above-mentioned investigative mechanism. Such a position is in direct contradiction to the commitments made by Azerbaijan, including those recently reiterated in the 23 January joint statements of the Presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By making belligerent statements and threats of starting a war, multiplying its military budget and organizing subversions and provocations on the border with Armenia and the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh, the Azerbaijani side not only creates obstacles for peaceful negotiations but also poses a real threat to regional security.

During the press conference with the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Hillary Clinton, held on 4 June in Yerevan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Edward Nalbandian, strongly condemned gross provocations organized by the Azeri side and noted that Azerbaijan was attempting to transfer the tension and escalate the situation on to the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which considerably undermined the negotiation process and threatened regional stability. The responsibility for all possible consequences of such activities lies on the Azeri side.

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 7 June 2012 addressed to you, I also draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire regime on the line of contact by the Azerbaijani side recorded for the month of May 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 35 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 8 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 to 31 May 2012

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
1.	1 May	Vazashen	01:15	AK	8
2.				PK	3
3.		Eraskh	12:40	AK	1
4.		Aygepar	13:40	AK	4
5.		Barekamavan	14:10	SVD	1
6.		Mehrab	18:20	DSHK	10
7.				PK	10
8.		Chinari	17:45	AK	60
9.				SVD	25
10.			19:00	Sniper 12.7mm	3
11.				AK	30
12.				PK	48
13.			19:40	Sniper 12.7mm	2
14.				PK	5
15.		Koti	19:35	SVD	4
16.	2 May	Chinari	12:50	SVD	10
17.			14:10	SVD	16
18.			14:30	SVD	15
19.				PK	5
20.				AK	70
21.				DSHK	3
22.			14:50	SVD	3
23.			23:40	SVD	3
24.		Aygedzor	21:00	SVD	12
25.		Aygepar	13:10	AK	2

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
26.	3 May	Vazashen	02:10	SVD	5
27.				PK	7
28.		Aygepar	13:30	AK	1
29.			21:30	AK	1
30.	4 May	Aygedzor	09:00	PK	15
31.			17:25	PK	6
32.		N.Karmiraqhbyur	11:20	AK	5
33.		Barekamavan	17:40	SVD	10
34.		Chinari	17:50	SVD	15
35.	5 May	Aygepar	00:30	AK	2
36.		Barcruni	21:20	SVD	3
37.		Movses	23:15	AK	2
38.			23:30	AK	30
39.		Chinari	23:35	PK	25
40.				SVD	15
41.				AK	20
42.	6 May	N.Karmiraqhbyur	00:30	AK	35
43.		Aygepar	00:40	AK	19
44.			18:25	AK	5
45.			19:15	AK	1
46.			20:55	AK	1
47.	7 May	Aygepar	12:20	AK	6
48.			12:55	AK	4
49.			13:30	DSHK	5
50.			20:40	AK	10
51.		Koti	22:25	AK	3

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
52.	8 May	Chinari	13:20	SVD	2
53.			16:40	SVD	1
54.			19:20	AK	3
55.			19:40	DSHK	7
56.			19:50	DSHK	5
57.				Sniper 12.7mm	7
58.			21:50	DSHK	12
59.				Sniper 12.7mm	7
60.				PK	40
61.			22:20	DSHK	20
62.				PK	30
63.		Aygehovit	20:20	AK	8
64.				PK	7
65.		Aygepar	21:30	PK	50
66.				DSHK	30
67.			22:00	DSHK	50
68.				PK	40
69.			22:50	DSHK	30
70.				PK	50
71.			23:40	DSHK	35
72.			23:55	DSHK	40
73.		Movses	22:10	DSHK	35
74.			23:10	DSHK	45
75.			23:20	DSHK	70
76.				PK	100
77.		N.Karmiraqhbyur	22:10	PK	40
78.			22:25	DSHK	30
79.				PK	60
80.		Vazashen	22:55	PK	50

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
81.	9 May	Aygepar	00:15	DSHK	13
82.		Aygepar, Movses N.Karmiraqhbyur	00:20-01:00	AK	400
83.				PK	600
84.				DSHK	550
85.		Chinari	01:05	SVD	3
86.				PK	7
87.				DSHK	3
88.				AK	3
89.			01:10	SVD	6
90.				PK	10
91.			01:15	SVD	7
92.		Aygepar, Movses, N.Karmiraqhbyur	01:10-01:45	AK	800
93.				PK	1250
94.				DSHK	1000
95.		Aygepar	13:00	AK	3
96.			22:50	AK	4
97.		Vazashen	19:50	AK	6
98.			20:15	AK	2
99.				PK	16
100.			20:30	AK	28
101.		Khndzorout	21:35	AK	47
102.				PK	7
103.	10 May	Aygepar	00:10	AK	6
104.			06:40	AK	3
105.		Sarigyuqh	12:30	SVD	7
106.				AK	25
107.			21:30	DSHK	15
108.		Movses	21:50	AK	5
109.	11 May	Aygepar	00:05	AK	8
110.			19:30	AK	3
111.		Barekamavan	12:30	AK	1
112.		Aygedzor	13:00	Sniper 12.7mm	3
113.		Sarigyuqh	14:30	DSHK	10
114.		Mehrab	15:20	AK	2

Number	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition
115.	12 May	Qarvajar	11:40	AK	40
116.		Berqaber		DSHK	1
117.				AK	40
118.		Paravaqar	17:30	PK	25
119.		Chinari	22:50	AK	3
120.			22:55	SVD	2
121.			23:00	AK	6
122.			23:05	AK	8
123.			23:10	PK	6
124.	13 May	Chinari	14:50	DSHK	2
125.				PK	3
126.		Aygepar	22:00	AK	9
127.			22:40	AK	15
128.	14 May	Chinari	15:50	AK	25
129.			16:00	SVD	2
130.				AK	8
131.	15 May	Chinari	01:50	AK	4
132.			19:50	SVD	47
133.			20:40	SVD	5
134.		Aygepar	13:00	AK	5
135.	16 May	Chinari	17:20	AK	6
136.				SVD	2
137.		Movses	21:25	AK	22
138.			22:10	DSHK	14
139.			22:30-22:50	DSHK	24
140.	17 May	Vahan	13:00	SVD	6
141.		Berdavan	18:45	AK	15
142.				Sniper 12.7mm	2
143.		Chinari	19:15	AK	7
144.		Barcruni	20:20	PK	25
145.				AK	20
146.		Movses	23:35	PK	13
147.				DSHK	8

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
148.	18 May	Chinari	06:20	SVD	3
149.			14:50	Sniper 12.7mm	2
150.		Ttujur	11:45	PK	100
151.		Aygepar	14:25	PK	6
152.		Aygedzor	16:30	DSHK	10
153.				PK	50
154.				SVD	50
155.		N.Karmiraqhbyur	18:55	AK	5
156.	19 May	N.Karmiraqhbyur	10:40	AK	4
157.		Movses	11:50	AK	16
158.		Aygepar	14:55	AK	2
159.			19:20	DSHK	3
160.	20 May	Aygepar	12:15	AK	3
161.			12:40	AK	3
162.		Barcruni	19:10	AK	60
163.	21 May	Arcvaberd	19:15	DSHK	12
164.				PK	15
165.		Tigranakert	23:40	AK	2
166.	22 May	Chinari	11:50	AK	15
167.				PK	15
168.		Barcruni		SVD	15
169.				PK	15
170.		Aygepar	17:30	AK	1
171.			21:50	AK	3
172.			23:35	AK	1
173.	23 May	Aygepar	07:50	AK	7
174.			09:20	AK	3
175.			21:40	PK	20

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
176.	24 May	Aygepar	00:05	AK	5
177.		Paravaqar	00:20	PK	25
178.			23:50	PK	20
179.		Movses	11:40	AK	5
180.			22:35	AK	17
181.		Berqaber	12:00	SVD	1
182.			14:25	SVD	6
183.				AK	14
184.			22:20	AK	15
185.		Sarigyuqh	15:35	SVD	5
186.				AK	15
187.		Aygepar	16:00	DSHK	20
188.			16:20	DSHK	15
189.				PK	35
190.			16:30	DSHK	15
191.			17:05	DSHK	17
192.				PK	15
193.			19:45	PK	12
194.			19:50	PK	3
195.			20:00	AK	4
196.		Berdavan	17:00	NSVT	20
197.		Doveqh	19:50	PK	20
198.			20:45	PK	5
199.		Chinari	23:50	AK	1
200.	25 May	Koti	03:00	AK	3
201.		Mehrab	12:35	PK	25
202.		Movses	13:40	Istigal	15
203.		Berqaber	22:10	AK	10
204.		Chinari	23:20	AK	40

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
205.	26 May	Shavarshavan	00:30	AK	3
206.		Chinari	02:00	SVD	5
207.		Aygedzor	11:30	PK	20
208.				Sniper 12.7mm	10
209.		Movses	11:40	PK	6
210.			14:30	Sniper 12.7mm	17
211.	27 May	Movses	18:30	AK	7
212.			18:35	PK	20
213.			20:55	AK	30
214.		Barcruni	21:45	Sniper 12.7mm	2
215.				PK	20
216.			22:55	Sniper 12.7mm	4
217.	28 May	Aygepar	00:05	AK	3
218.			11:25	PK	2
219.		Chinari	13:55	AK	4
220.		Sevakavan	19:10	AK	3
221.			19:55	AK	2
222.	29 May	Sevakavan	00:15	AK	15
223.		Aygepar	13:05	AK	2
224.		Barekamavan	14:40	SVD	2
225.			15:35	AK	11
226.		Qarvachar	19:10	Sniper 12.7mm	20
227.				DSHK	25
228.	30 May	Mehrab	10:45	Sniper 12.7mm	2
229.			16:40	Sniper 12.7mm	10
230.		Movses	16:30	AK	4
231.		Qarvachar	20:30	DSHK	100
232.				AK	200

Number	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
233.	31 May	Berdavan	1:05	AK	7
234.		Berqaber	16:30	SVD	6
235.		Chinari	18:30	Sniper 12.7mm	2
236.			18:35	SVD	3
237.		Berqaber	23:05	AK	8
238.				DSHK	6

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 to 31 May 2012

Number of violations — 238

Shots — about 8,206

PK ~ (3,002), SVD ~ (323), sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ (93), AK ~ (2,463), DSHK ~ (2,290), Istigal ~ (15), NSVT — (20)

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 to 31 May 2012

Number of violations — 1,248

Shots — about 5,363

PK ~ (645), SVD ~ (501), AK ~ (4,005), DSHK ~ (77), RPK ~ (72), sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ (45), Utyos ~ (18)

PK — Kalashnikov machine gun

SVD — 7.9 mm sniper weapon

AK — Kalashnikov rifle

DSHK — 12.7 mm machine gun

RPK — 5.45 mm machine gun

RPG — Grenade launcher

Utyos — 12.7 mm machine gun

NSVT — 12.7 mm machine gun

Istigal — 14.5 mm machine gun

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Letter dated 13 June 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With regard to the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, please find enclosed a letter from Mr. Riek Machar Teny, Vice-President of the Republic of South Sudan (see annex). This letter is a replacement for the letter dated 6 June 2012 on the same matter.

I would be most grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a replacement letter to the members of the Security Council as the final document on the matter.

(*Signed*) Francis **Nazario**
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

12-37198 (E) 210612

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Annex to the letter dated 13 June 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Re: Renewal of Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) establishing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan/Chapter VII mandate

I first wish to convey to you the greetings and salutations of my President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, as we approach the one-year anniversary of the independence of the Republic of South Sudan and mark the existence of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

On 6 June 2012, I wrote a letter on the above-mentioned topic and other issues, which was misaddressed to your predecessor. I am sorry for this. The other issues which I discussed in that letter have now been resolved between me and Ms. Hilde Johnson, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as these issues fall within the competence of the head of Mission. In addition, I wish to state that since the establishment of UNMISS, the Mission has been able to support and contribute towards the realization of peace and security in our country. My Government acknowledges with appreciation the partnership which has enhanced our efforts to build a nation.

Recognizing that the Security Council will discuss the renewal of the mandate of UNMISS, as stipulated in resolution 1996 (2011), my Government conducted an internal review of the performance of the Mission in relation to its mandate (see enclosure). This review has highlighted a number of areas where collaboration between the Republic of South Sudan and UNMISS has been positive. This includes support in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, human rights legislation, capacity-building and law enforcement. Notably, the Mission also provided valuable support to the Republic of South Sudan throughout the intercommunal violence in Jonglei state in December and January 2011 and subsequently provided strong logistical support to the Presidential Committee for Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei. This review is under discussion between the Mission and us.

Notwithstanding the positive role that the Mission has played in the aforementioned areas, the Republic of South Sudan would like to highlight the inappropriateness of the mandate in its current form. On 8 July 2011, in establishing the mandate under Chapter VII, the Security Council determined that "the situation faced by South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region". This determination was made before the independence of the Republic of South Sudan. Since independence, the Republic of South Sudan has taken responsibility for the safety and security of our citizens. The continued principal threats to international peace and security in the region are the outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues and the tensions with the Republic of Sudan, in particular their continued military aggression against South Sudan, including repeated bombings. Therefore, it is our view that the situation according to which the determination for Chapter VII was made has since progressed and it is no longer appropriate to renew the mandate on the basis of Chapter VII.

In view of the above, my Government would like for our position to be taken into serious consideration during the debate on the renewal of the mandate.

Kindly circulate the present letter to the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Riek Machar **Teny-Dhurgon**
Vice-President, Republic of South Sudan
Co-Chair of the Joint Mechanism of the UNMISS Mandate

Enclosure

Evaluation report on the UNMISS mandate (Security Council resolution 1996 (2011)) from July 2011 to July 2012 by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan

Executive Summary

This report reviews progress made to date under the UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) of July 8th 2011, and makes recommendations for a possible renewal of the UNMISS mandate. In line with recommendations coming out of the initial review process, the Government established a Technical Assessment and Evaluation Unit to support its Ministerial Team in the Joint Mechanism of the UNMISS mandate. The present report has been compiled by this Technical unit, and includes contributions from the Government institutions concerned with the current mandate of UNMISS.

The report first lists the achievements in terms of cooperation with and support from UNMISS over the period of the current mandate (July 2011 – present), it then notes the key challenges and areas for improvement that were raised by the concerned Government agencies. Considering the areas in which UNMISS has demonstrated good progress under the current mandate, and areas where it has not, the report goes on to make specific recommendations for the process of mandate renewal in July 2012.

The evaluation has shown that the Government of the Republic of South Sudan has achieved its obligations in the following key areas; 1) Political Development, including constituting of the National and State Legislature, the formation of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan at national and State Government level and in achieving political inclusiveness.

The Government with support from UNMISS has made significant achievements in the following areas; 1) Peace-Building, including improvement in the Human Rights situation, strengthening of the Peace Commission, mitigation of conflicts and inter-communal violence, moving forward with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and achieving community security and small arms control; and 2) State-Building. However, UNMISS had a negligible contribution in Economic Development throughout the mandate period and its transparency and accountability was remarkably questioned across the country.

The principal challenges that have emerged through this assessment and evaluation have been UNMISS failure in the areas of protection of civilians, delivery of basic physical infrastructure such as quick impact projects (namely airfields, bridges, roads and community centers), communication and coordination, transparency and accountability.

Drawing on the achievements and challenges identified in the course of this assessment and evaluation review, the final section of this report outlines the following specific recommendations:

1. UNMISS should improve its outreach program of its scope and mandate, relationship, coordination and communication with relevant Government institutions at national, State and local government levels to help South Sudan fulfill its state-building and peace-building obligations.

2. The Government after its review of the UNMISS performance for the past one year period from July 2011 to date is resolved to seek UN Security Council members for consideration of recommended changes and specifically to Chapter VII.

3. It is clear that many of the functions under the current mandate, such as institutional capacity development aspects of the mandate, can be undertaken by the existing UN Specialized Agencies and other bilateral donors.

4. UNMISS during its mandate has contributed negatively in the economy of the Republic of South Sudan, it is unfortunately observed that the UNMISS maintain its accounts outside the country and feed the black market through sale of its hard currency financial transfers.

5. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be renegotiated including the composition, size and downsizing of such forces.

6. This Assessment and Evaluation review report should be shared with the UN Security Council in its sitting for discussion of UNMISS due mandate and to lobby directly with the permanent Security Council members on a revision of the UNMISS mandate.

Content of the Report

1. Introduction

2. Achievements

   a. Political Development

      i. National Legislature

      ii. Formation of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan

      iii. Political Inclusiveness

   b. Peace-Building

      i. Human Rights

      ii. Peace Commission

      iii. Conflicts and Inter-Communal Violence

      iv. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

      v. Community Security and Small Arms Control

   c. State-Building and Economic Development

      i. Transparency and Accountability

      ii. Law Enforcement and Civil Protection

      iii. Governance and Rule of Law

3. Challenges

   a. Protection of Civilians

   b. Communication and Coordination

   c. Infrastructure Development

   d. Rule of Law and Law Enforcement

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Introduction

This report reviews progress made to date under the UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) of July 8th 2011, and makes recommendations for a possible renewal of the UNMISS mandate. The evaluation has been carried out by the Technical unit of the Ministerial Team of the Joint Mechanism for UN Mandate. The Technical unit has considered the reports of several Ministries, Commissions, and independent institutions that are engaged with the UNMISS mandate. The evaluation focuses on the level of UNMISS cooperation and support to the GRSS during the period July 2011-July 2012, as stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011). This evaluation report aims at evaluating the achievements and challenges under the current UNMISS mandate with an aim to seek a revision of the mandate when it is renewed.

In adopting SCR 1996 (2011), the UN Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council established UNMISS for an initial period of one year, starting from 8 July 2011, with the intention to renew the UNMISS mandate for further periods as may be required. The UNMISS mandate will be up for renewal on 8 July, 2012.

The current UNMISS mandate is wide-ranging, covering state-building and economic development, Governance and rule of law capacities, as well as peace-building and civil protection. The current mandate authorizes UNMISS to: 1) support peace consolidation, thereby fostering conditions for longer-term state-building and economic development; 2) support the Government in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and its responsibilities to protect civilians, and 3) support the Government to develop its capacity to provide security, establish rule of law, and strengthen the security and justice sectors.

2. Achievements.

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan has made the following achievements during the UNMISS mandate from July 2011 to date:

2. a. Political Development

- The people of South Sudan overwhelmingly voted 98.99 for secession and declared its Independence on the 9th July 2011.
- The new State of South Sudan established national legislature institutions,
- The Republic of South Sudan took serious measures to ensure accountability and transparency.

- The Republic of South Sudan has been engaged in mitigation of conflicts and inter-communal violence to ensure peace and stability for socio- economic development.

2. a. i. National Legislature

- The President issued a decree transforming and reconstituting the National Legislature and State Legislatures,
- The President following consultations with political parties appointed members of the National Constitutional Review Commission. Of the total of 45 members, different political parties were represented, Faith based groups, and Civil Society Organizations were significantly represented.

2. a. ii. Formation of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.

- The President Gen.Salva Kiir Mayardit issued a decree appointing the 1st Cabinet members of the new State composed of 29 ministers and 32 deputies.
- The President confirmed the respective Governors of the 10 States who have formed their State respective governments and the counties commissioners.
- The President appointed Chairpersons of Commissions and Independent Institutions.

2. a. iii. Political Inclusiveness.

- The President after consultation with Political Parties Leaders in the Political Parties Leadership Forum shared power with the political parties at national, State and local government levels in the first cabinet of the Independent Republic of South Sudan in late. August 2011.
- The Transitional Constitution provided political plat-form for the recent political parties' consensus on Political Parties Bill 2012 that has now been enacted into Political Parties Act which requires parties to register within 90 days of formation of Political Parties Council.

2. b. Peace-Building.

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan ministries, Commissions and Independent Institutions in collaboration with UNMISS has achieved the following:

2. b. i. Human Rights

- Supported with a series of workshops and trainings and seminars to civil society organizations and Human Rights Officers to build capacities.
- Developed the Human Rights Commission policy framework and strategic plans;
- Established Human Rights Commission offices in all the 10 States and in more than half of the 79 counties across the country;
- Held sensitization workshops and Human Rights Officers' capacity building in Juba and at the State level;
- Human Rights Commission conducted facts -finding visits which continued until early February 2012 on Jonglei inter-communal violence.

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan, following the crisis of Jonglei, appointed an investigation committee to investigate the violence, which is soon to commence its work.

2. b. ii. Peace Commission

- Consolidated peace and reconciliation at the State, counties and Payams level.
- Enabled women's participation in the Jonglei peace process together with UN Women
- Participated in the peace and reconciliation process in Jonglei State;
- The Vice President's movement for inter-communal peace-building meetings in the four States of Lakes, Unity, Warrap, and Jonglei.

2. b. iii. Conflicts and Inter-Communal Violence

- The Government of the Republic of South Sudan with support of UNMISS formed a Peace and Reconciliation Committee following the inter-communal violence in Jonglei State in December 2011.
- Conducted a peaceful disarmament campaign following the inter-communal violence in Jonglei State.

- Coordinated intervention during the Jonglei inter-communal violence in early December 2011;
- Provides logistical support to SPLA deployments into Jonglei State. Provided support to UNMISS by making its own helicopters available to airlift UNMISS equipment into Jonglei State
- Provided logistical support in efforts to resolve the recent inter-communal violence in Jonglei State;
- Support from UNMISS, OCHA during the inter-communal violence in Tonj East County in Warrap and Mayiandit County in Unity State, in which medical and relief support was availed to the victims of those attacks in February 2012;
- UNMISS support was substantial when it evacuated 180 wounded civilians and 18 humanitarian personnel. Also, up to 3,500 civilians sought refuge in UNMISS military compounds in Pibor and Akobo;

2. b. IV. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

- Developed and approved a joint DDR Strategic Plan;
- Established the DDR offices in the ten States and completed three prisons facilities in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Warap States.
- Capacity building to the national DDR staff at national and state levels;
- Engaged in facilitation and support to civil disarmament, demobilization of child soldiers, elderly and disabled persons in the SPLA.

2. b. v. Community Security and Small Arms Control

- UNMISS support to Community Security and Small Arms Control through facilitation of sensitization workshops and availing of transitional storage facility for the fire arms collected from the disarmed civil populations in Jonglei.

2. c. State-Building and Economic Development

2. c. i. Transparency and Accountability

- The President issued took series of measures to strengthen the systems for transparency and accountability before and after the independence;
- The enactment of the financial management act 2012;

The appointment of the Constitutional Supreme Court judge to head the Anti-Corruption Commission.

2. c. ii. Law Enforcement and Civil Protection

- UNMISS provided jointly with the Ministry of Interior different levels of training programs to the South Sudan Police Service;
- The civil protection and provision of security across the country has been going through significant changes through the training of the police service by the UNMISS police;
- Following advocacy efforts at the Ministry of Interior, due to several security incidents against international workers, SSPS increased their presence in Juba;
- UNMISS is working with the Ministry of Interior and the SSPS to establish a diplomatic police unit for standby protection for UN staff and foreign diplomats in Juba.

2. c. iii. Governance and Rule of Law

- The Government of the Republic of South Sudan has put in place several laws passed by the National Legislature on Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Social Welfare, Foreign Trade and Investment and many others;
- Formation of national policies in varied areas were some of the important areas of cooperation and support;
- UNMISS facilitated Women's engagement in constitution-making processes.

3. Challenges

3. a. Protection of Civilians

- UNMISS failed to provide protection to the civil populations who were desperate for protection as stipulated in its Chapter VII manadate during aerial bombardment and border incursions by the Republic of Sudan. The recent aerial bombardment by the Republic of Sudan Air Force along the Borders of Unity, Upper Nile, Western Bhar Al- Ghazal and Northern Bhar Al-Ghazal States (Antinov Bombers, MIG-16 and Helicopters Gunships) are clear instances of UNMISS lack of capacity to undertake protection of civil populations from an imminent attack.

3. b. Communication and Coordination

- Reports are submitted and shared with other parties without prior verification of facts with the relevant Government agencies;
- UNMISS scope and mandate dissemination has been limited not only at the national level but also at the state and Local government levels;
- Movement of personnel has in the past not been communicated to Government and the security organs, resulting in potentially dangerous situations;
- UNMISS supplies and equipment is not being approved and authorized and given security clearance through the national security bodies;
- Foreigners, including Sudanese, are employed without any consultation with the GRSS security services.

3. c. Infrastructure Development

- UNMISS has contributed little in the area of infrastructure development even in the "quick impacts projects" in its operational sites at the counties level such as police civil protection facilities and community centers;
- The UNMISS with huge administrative budget has hardly spent on permanent construction facilities and accessible roads at national, State and local government levels;
- Infrastructure support is needed in terms of training centers in the States.

3. d. Rule of Law and Law Enforcement

- There is need for greater support in capacity building for judges and legal councilors;
- Staff get training periods need to be increased so that more benefit staff;
- There should be improvement of joint monitoring, particularly on cattle rustling;
- South Sudan Police who have been trained through UNMISS need to be accredited for international recognition;
- More assistance is needed in the development and implementation of the internal accountability process.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be renegotiated. At the time of the SOFA agreement there was no legal department in a position to review the agreement. Now that there is, SOFA should be reviewed. The deployment of forces should be well coordinated with the Government and relevant security organs. Movement of personnel has in the past not been communicated with Government and the security organs, resulting in potentially dangerous situations and this should be addressed through better information sharing. There also needs to be transparency from UNMISS about its employment policy. Foreigners, including Sudanese, are employed and they pose a potential risk to South Sudan. Names of staff proposed for employment should be submitted to the government. Places should be given with preference to qualified RSS nationals and any company from outside the RSS should be formally vetted.



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Security Council

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Letter dated 11 June 2012 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I refer to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and to Security Council resolution 2000 (2011), and have the honour to convey to you a letter from His Excellency Jeannot Kouadio-Ahoussou, Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire (see annex).

The letter dated 25 May 2012 requests the extension of the mandate of UNOCI in all its aspects beyond 31 July 2012, so as to ensure the successful conduct of local elections which are expected to take place during the last quarter of 2012. Previous Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1933 (2010) and 2000 (2011), have mandated UNOCI to support the organization and conduct of open, free and fair presidential and legislative elections.

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

12-36999 (E) 120612 120612

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Annex

Letter dated 25 May 2012 from the Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]

By its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004 on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Subsequent Security Council resolutions concerning the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular resolution 2000 (2011) of 27 July 2011, specified the legal framework for United Nations electoral assistance in Côte d'Ivoire.

This assistance and the support of the international community have allowed our country to conduct successful elections and emerge from the crisis, with the holding of the elections for President of the Republic in 2010 and for deputies to the National Assembly in 2011.

Thus, Côte d'Ivoire has recently reached a decisive stage in the process of calming the sociopolitical environment and normalization of its institutions.

It is important, however, to continue and complete the normalization and institutional stabilization process by putting into place all of the decentralized bodies for the management of State affairs by holding local elections.

In accordance with the relevant provisions of our country's Constitution and Electoral Code, the Independent Electoral Commission will very shortly begin preparations, in agreement with the Government, for the election of municipal councillors and regional councillors, planned for the last quarter of 2012.

All Ivorian political groups and civil society organizations recognize that holding these local elections will provide a powerful catalyst in the national reconciliation process that is under way.

In that regard, and in the spirit of consolidation of the fledgling Ivorian democracy, on 27 and 28 April 2012 at Grand-Bassam in Côte d'Ivoire, the Government called a meeting with the major opposition political parties and groups. This meeting enabled the country's political leaders to establish an ongoing republican dialogue which will have the effect of expanding and accelerating the national reconciliation process in concrete ways.

The launching of this republican dialogue should help, furthermore, to ensure the participation of groups of all political leanings in the forthcoming local elections, thereby strengthening their inclusiveness.

In order to hold these local elections, and based on the measures taken by the Government, the Independent Electoral Commission and UNOCI at the time of the presidential and legislative elections, the necessary logistical, financial and security resources must be mobilized.

However, after emerging from the grave post-election crisis it experienced in 2011, and despite the significant progress noted in recent months in various

socioeconomic sectors, the financial and security situation in Côte d'Ivoire remains fragile.

Therefore, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire hereby requests the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which is due to expire on 31 July 2012, in all its aspects — political, technical (legal assistance, logistics and human resources) and security — to allow Côte d'Ivoire once again to ensure that local elections, representing the two final steps in the Ivorian election cycle begun in 2007, are held successfully.

The Ivorian Government takes this opportunity to convey to you once again its hearty thanks for the effective support provided by UNOCI to Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the assurances of its highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Jeannot **Kouadio-Ahoussou**